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ABSTRACT
This is a methodological article that documented my theory building process. 
Inspired by the recommendations of Glaser, I fashioned my own methodology 
in creating my own theory. It is an observance of: (1) autonomy; (2) originality; 
and (3) contribution. The process is an amalgamation of: (1) Classical Grounded 
Theory; (2) Pragmatic Grounded Theory; and (3) Practitioner-based theory 
building. The method is coined as Experience-Based theory building. To facilitate 
abstraction and get away with plain description, it exploited autosampling 
technique initially and theoretical sampling dominantly. This approach is highly 
retroductive, a synergy of: (1) induction; (2) deduction; and (3) abduction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Glaser (2006) claimed that doctoral 
students are expected to create their own theory 
and methodology in doing their dissertation. 
Autonomy, originality, and contribution are the 
three key elements he emphasized (Glaser, 2006). 
The Doctor of Philosophy (Phd) candidate must be 
autonomous in their quest for knowledge. Their 
pursuit for innovative and novel: (1) procedures, 
and (2) information; are highly personal. The 
product of their autonomy and originality are 
their contributions. I personally believe these 
contributions may not be expedient at present, 
but have enormous utility in the future. With 
this challenge, I was able to discover a theory-
building technique amalgamating: (1) classical 
GT (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, 2006); (2) pragmatic 
GT (Charmaz, 2006); and (3) practitioner-based 
theory building (Nielsen, 2010). This paper 
documented the discovery of experience-based 
theory building.
The method I have fashioned guises similar to 
practice or practitioner’s theory building (Nielsen, 
2010). It is the induction of a theory based on 
experiences (Bendassolli, 2013). What makes my 
own methodology novel is that it is initially based 
on my own personal experience and corroborated 
with the experiences of others. Unlike those 
discussed by Nielsen (2010) and Bendassolli 
(2013), they are induced from the informants who 
were practitioners or those who had experienced 
the phenomenon. 
The data analysis utilized trailed concepts from 
both classical and pragmatic GT.  Methodological 
decisions were based on my philosophical stances 
in the conduct of this particular exploration. The 
method was shaped based on: (a) how I see the 
reality of the phenomenon; and (b) what I think is 
the best approach to arrive in conceptualization.
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II. CONDITIONS
The following are the conditions to the 
experience-based GT:
1. Data are initially induced from the 
researcher’s experiences; 
2. The inquiry embarked atheoretical; 
3. The researcher’s experiences must be a 
cluster of conceptually similar events: 
3.1. Single incident experience shall be 
treated as contaminant when it 
cannot be conϐirmed with other 
means;
4. Researcher’s personal experiences must 
be conϐirmed with the experiences of 
others: 
4.1. Conϐirmed experiences must be taken 
as data saturation, and
4.2. Experiences of others that are deviant 
from the researcher’s experiences 
must be recognized as alternative 
realities:
4.2.1. It must be conϐirmed until data 
saturation arrives; otherwise 
it is treated as a contaminant;  
5. Incidences are sampled and not persons: 
5.1. Incidences are taken from any or a 
combination of the following:
5.1.1. Interviews,
5.1.2. Observations,
5.1.3. Existing databases, or
5.1.4. Literature.
III. PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE
This method was initially naturalistic (Thales 
as cited by Roper, 2010). I integrated interpretivism 
(Boas, 1887a,b,c) and constructivism (Dewey, 
1938). I believed that my experiences should 
be studied in context (Botan & Kreps, 1999). 
I examined the object of inquiry without any 
presumptions or expectations. Although I never 
commenced in a tabula rasa state (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967, 2006), I attempted to bracket 
out personal biases and neutrally scrutinized 
the context (Ray, 1985). It marked objectivity in 
qualitative inquiry amidst its subjective or relative 
nature. The following are philosophical guides for 
novice researchers who will adapt my methods in 
their inquiry: 
Using the interpretative approach, one cannot 
get away from personal viewpoints. However, 
this procedure must only occur in the analytic 
process. Researchers must be careful not to 
exploit personal interpretations before data 
collection. The interpretative analysis should be 
done simultaneously with data collection. It is 
essential since it provides a conceptual agenda 
that is useful to substantiate the data. It is the 
unique feature of the naturalistic inquiry since it 
does not interpret data based on a predetermined 
framework. Conceptualizations are induced and 
grounded from the data.  
Data analysis, apart from the researcher’s 
personal interpretation, may look into the data 
as personally constructed by the informant. 
Although the researcher’s interpretation is 
constructivist in nature, other sources of data, 
aside from the researcher’s experiences, must 
be interpreted from their own lenses and must 
be presented side-by-side with the researcher’s 
personal interpretation. The researchers are 
reminded that there is no single truth (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 2008; Creswell & Planno Clark, 2011). 
Truth is relative. It is constructed by each actor 
with different perspectives. It must be scrutinized 
carefully to document the multiplicity of realities 
that make theorizing more substantial. In other 
words, truth or reality, whether it is objective or 
subjective, must be treated equally. In GT, there is 
no such divide. Conceptualizations are the same 
regardless of sources and procedures.  
The interpretative conceptualizations of the 
researcher are based on data. Though conceptual 
induction of data is technically relative in nature, 
it must be honestly done and empirically deduced 
with another incident. It is its positivistic and 
objective nature. Therefore, this particular GT 
process involved two paradigms: (a) initially 
naturalistic; and (b) as a conϐirming point, 
positivistic.
IV. PROCESS OF INVESTIGATION
I trailed a retroductive research process 
(Wallace, 1971). The involved  processes were 
induction, deduction and abduction that were 
amalgamated to produce a substantive theory. I 
was convinced by the recommendations of Foot, 
Warnick and Schneider (2005) wherein identiϐied 
concepts or constructs were derived between 
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thoughts and conϐirmation that links both 
inductive and deductive approaches in theory 
building. Each route nourished the progression 
of conceptualization. It is a mechanism that 
allowed the triangulation of concepts (Downward 
& Mearman, 2006). Although, abduction was 
not mentioned in the GT literatures my readings 
support that it be part of retroduction. Technically, 
it is considered as a specialized form of induction.
Induction. Initially, data were induced 
from my personal experiences that allowed the 
identiϐication of concepts or initial codes. Polit 
and Beck (2012) deϐined it as a process of making 
inference based on observations or experiences 
that are paired with critical analysis. This analytic 
process provided purposive culling of relevant 
data. The researcher then integrates the data 
to formulate a theory that aids in explaining the 
phenomenon (Polit & Beck, 2010).  
Deduction. Conceptualizations induced from 
personal experiences are deductively veriϐied. The 
induced data serve as a theoretical framework or 
an a priori that are veriϐied by another incident or 
case. Polit and Beck (2012) deϐined the process 
of deduction as a mechanism for descending 
hypotheses. Relationship of concepts in a theory 
can never be veriϐied unswervingly. Through 
deduction, tentative hypotheses induced from 
data are conϐirmed through theoretically sampled 
incidents. It is to conϐirm authenticity. It provides a 
clearer and thicker theoretical substantiation. The 
researcher just needs to be aware of the difference 
between conceptualization and description. The 
focus of GT is theorizing and not describing. It is 
further discussed later in the text. 
Theoretical Sampling. Theory-based culling 
embroils the miscellany of incidents based on a 
priori conceptualization that is being qualitatively 
scrutinized (Polit & Beck, 2008). According to 
Charmaz (2006), theoretical sampling means 
looking for relevant data to progress an emerging 
theory. It aims to intricately polish the: (a) group 
of concepts; and (b) relationship of categories. 
Incident culling culminates when no new concepts 
emerge. This procedure keeps the researcher 
away from unfocused analysis.  
 I must make it clear that initial sampling in the 
study was not theoretical sampling. I must remind 
the reader that the initial utilized sampling in this 
GT was autosampling that I personally coined 
and deϐined as “purposively culling personal 
experiences of the researcher himself that is 
substantial to the domain of inquiry.” Charmaz 
(2006) made clear that GT must start with an 
initial sampling (most of the time purposive 
in nature). She further explained that initial 
sampling in GT is where one starts, and theoretical 
sampling directs the GTist where to go. Therefore, 
it is correct to claim that initial sampling is an 
inductive approach while theoretical sampling 
is a deductive approach. Charmaz added that 
its logic began with the data. Tentative thoughts 
are induced and probed through empirical and 
deductive reasoning. It means that one must move 
back and forth with data (Hood, 1983). Moving 
back and forth is a retroductive approach. 
Theoretical sampling as an emergent approach 
(Charmaz, 2006): (1) conϐirms the intuitions 
about categories; (2) saturates the properties 
of a category; (3) differentiates categories; (4) 
elucidates interaction between categories; and 
(5) recognizes process variation. It is emergent 
because one cannot determine what to sample 
not until new conceptualization based on induced 
analysis requires it.  
Conceptualization vs. Description. One is 
no longer doing GT if description is focused and 
conceptualization is put aside (Glaser, 2005). 
The researcher must avoid describing details 
of the incidence and must put emphasis on the 
determination of the involved processes through 
conceptualization. It means that: (a) concepts 
are identiϐied; and (b) relationship of concepts 
with each other is determined. Consequently, 
researchers must situate their thoughts in 
its general form and not in a speciϐic fashion 
(Padua, 2013). Speciϐic discussion happens 
when researchers are engrossed in describing 
a phenomenon, failing to conceptualize. 
Conceptualization only happens when analyzers 
process the information in its general form. 
Conceptualization vs. Accuracy. In GT, 
concepts do not change when facts change. Glaser 
and Strauss (1967, 2006) emphasized that GT 
aimed to discover a theory. Therefore, it is germane 
to generate general categories, their properties 
and the general relationship with each other. The 
substantiation from which conceptualizations 
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occurred exempliϐies the concept. GT is not 
concerned with accuracy. The evidence needs 
not be precise. Regardless of exactitude, these 
concepts are undoubtedly signiϐicant conceptual 
abstraction. Researchers verify by qualifying the 
enormous conceptualization beyond relative 
accuracy.  
Glaser (2007) pronounced that the product of 
GT is transcending abstraction and not accurate 
description. The researcher must not be disturbed 
whether the data is accurate reality or truth. It 
can be relative. Accuracy is not a GT concern. 
However, it is the researcher’s responsibility to do 
constant comparative analysis honesty. It dictates 
the researcher not to guide analysis on how he or 
she wants to see things but on how it was induced 
from data.
Abduction. There were times when I did 
not know where to go to. With this experience, I 
decided to gather information without knowing 
what to do with them. By abducting data without 
a priori, my conceptualization extended by: 
(1) objectively making sense from nothing 
(Habermas, 1978); and (2) introducing new ideas 
(Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). Abductive extrapolation 
allowed me to see all conceivable hypothetical 
explanations. I empirically scrutinized them 
via deductive approach and hunted for the 
most reasonable explanation (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967/2006). Again, this process allowed me to 
move back and forth with data (Hood, 1983). This 
approach intensiϐied my theorizing process. 
All is Data 
Glaser pronounced “all is data.” It means that 
everything that is derived from the investigatory 
scene is data regardless of the source (Glaser, 
2007). Sources may include: (a) interviews; (b) 
observations; or (c) documents. One must recognize 
that taken information from these sources are not 
the actual data themselves. The actual GT data 
were discovered from conceptualization through 
constant comparison that generates categories 
and its properties. These are either: (a) baseline; 
(b) properline; (c) vague; (d) interpreted; or (e) 
conceptual. With this dictum, there is no such 
thing as: (a) bias; (b) objective or subjective; or 
(c) interpreted or misinterpreted. It is anything 
the researcher is formulating for transcending 
abstraction regardless of the process.  
In my study, I started with the data from 
myself. I purposively culled my experiences 
relevant to the domain of inquiry. My experiences 
were documented through reϐlection notes. 
Theoretically sampled incidences were derived 
through: (1) interviews of people with similar 
experiences; (2) interviews of people who had 
witnessed my experiences; and (3) documented 
incidence of people experiencing similar 
experiences (literature).  The ϐirst two were neither 
audio-recorded nor transcribed in verbatim. They 
were only ϐield noted. Glaser (2004) recommends 
ϐield noting over verbatim transcriptions. 
Although Glaser (1978) cautioned the 
researcher to avoid reading the literature before 
the theoretical framework is stabilized, he also 
mentioned that GTist may ϐlex this prescription 
depending on the need of the inquiry. I cautiously 
made sure that the codes were not initially 
derived from the literature. Literatures were only 
theoretically sampled to: (1) conϐirm my personal 
experiences; and (2) sanction theoretical ϐit.
 Constant Comparative Analysis
A process called constant comparison was 
dawdled to conceptually progress and cultivate 
germane categories. Categories induced from 
the data were constantly compared with the 
new data for commonalities and variations. Data 
gathering proceeded by concentrating on evolving 
conceptualizations. I compared concepts emerging 
from the data with comparable concepts from 
another data source, existing theory or literature 
to gauge which segments have promising ϐit with 
the generated theory (Polit & Beck, 2012; Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967/2006; Glaser, 2001). 
Speciϐic to my study, I constantly compared 
each incidence culled from my experiences. 
Each comparative process identiϐied universal 
and diverse conceptualizations. I conϐirmed 
my personal experiences with theoretically 
sampled incidences from: (1) other researcher’s 
experiences via interviews and recollection of 
actual observations; and (2) existing literature 
exposing analogous occurrences. These incidences 
were constantly compared from each other. 
Transcription, Formulation of Concepts and 
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Categories, Initial Coding, and Memoing
Initially, I was transcribing my personal 
experience. The transcripts were subjected to 
initial coding wherein concepts were identiϐied. I 
must emphasize that the transcriptions were not 
verbatim write-up of interviews. These are ϐield 
notes and reϐlection notes of (Glaser, 2004): (1) 
the recall of my experiences; (2) the reϐlection of 
interviews; and (3) ϐield notes from observations. 
Glaser suggested that the use of tape-recorded 
data is not necessary since it is a waste of time. 
Field notes are preferred since they are already a 
product of the analytic process.  
I further coded some of the incidences I 
theoretically sampled. I noticed that I was not 
doing GT since I failed to do conceptualization. I 
was focused to the descriptive part which is not 
the intention of GT.  Although coding transcripts 
is necessary to formulate initial codes, I was 
trapped by the QDA (Qualitative Data Analysis) 
process and failed to trail the GT process. My 
dilemma is further discussed later in the text.  I 
opened the literature and found my answer to my 
quandary.  Glaser (2005) noted that GTist must 
not focus on the prescription of QDA (utilized 
by ethnographers and phenomenologists) but 
directed towards conceptualization. After doing 
QDA with (5) incidences that I theoretically 
sampled, I shifted to memo writing that trailed 
me to the actual conceptualization and prevented 
me from concentrating on descriptions. 
According to Charmaz (2006), memo writing 
points unswervingly to theoretical sampling. 
It is a tactical, explicit and methodical process 
that anticipates to intricately contextualize 
and identify my theoretical categories. This 
sampling technique is contingent to the identiϐied 
categories. The identiϐied categories are the result 
of writing the memos. Although identiϐication of 
speciϐic concepts is dependent from coding the 
transcripts, one must transcend the process to 
theorizing. Furthermore, theoretical sampling 
may not go  back to coding transcripts like doing 
QDA - although this can be done in appropriate 
cases. This fundamental GT approach assisted me 
to demarcate and advance the properties of my 
categories including the width of its variations. 
Writing memos allowed me to identify the 
completeness or incompleteness of my categories. 
Gaps were then analyzed and aided with 
theoretical sampling technique. This engagement 
prodded me to foresee the direction of looking 
for more data that plugged the gap and saturated 
the categories. Take note that what we want to 
saturate are categories and not speciϐic concepts. 
It is another feature of GT that is distinctive from 
other QDA processes. 
 Writing memos, therefore, aided my analytic 
process. It guided me to start writing the theory 
and stop doing endless and unnecessary QDA 
techniques. The memos emerged from grounded 
comparative analysis of cumulative data. 
Incompleteness signaled the gap that prompted 
further data collection. This time, I trailed the 
collection of relevant data and not the unnecessary 
ones. It then expedited me increasingly to write 
more abstract and conceptual memos.  
You notice that the process I trailed is not 
linear. It is a cyclical process of: (1) data collection; 
(2) coding; and (3) writing memos (analyzing). 
Sampling stopped when the constructs were 
chockfull. Robustness was reached when 
relationship between categories was clear. It is 
effective memo writing that I invigorated to reϐlect 
on and designate patterns in the data, interactions 
among categories, and nascent conceptualizations.
Openness
Dey (1999) suggested that there is a big 
difference between an open mind and an empty 
head. Openness is ascertained by Glaser (1978, 
1992) to get away from the deduction based from 
a priori (theoretical frameworks) and put afϐinity 
to induction. We only need to bracket out what 
we previously know. Remaining open is trying to 
understand what we can learn while coding and 
where it can take us (Charmaz, 2006). It may or 
may not be congruent to what we already know. 
Glaser (1978, 1998) constantly reminds GTist 
to remain open to theoretical possibilities. The 
analytic process concentrates in interrogating 
what the data represents. It must be put in mind 
in the initial step of the analytic process. With this 
question in mind, it allowed me to pursue the most 
essential response that ϐits the domain of inquiry. 
In the process of analysis, I ascertained speciϐic 
meanings and actions that proposed theoretical 
relationship to convincing conceptualizations that 
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were not revealed in the existing compilation of 
culled incidences. With an open mind, it allowed 
me to search for theoretical possibilities. It then 
called for more theoretical sampling that further 
reϐined conceptualization towards robustness. 
I was directed to remain open to all possible 
theoretical directions in the earlier stages of the 
analytic process. When categories were clear, more 
focused theoretical sampling occurred. Remaining 
open does not necessarily mean remaining open 
all the time. It only suggests remaining open when 
categories (or a speciϐic category) are still unclear. 
A more focused approach proceeded when 
theoretical integration begun.
My Mistake with QDA
My mistake started with my use of qualitative 
data analysis software HyperResearch version 
2.8.3. Fairly, it did help me in the initial part of my 
data analysis: open coding. It was then acceptable 
when I was still doing my initial purposive 
sampling. I was autosampling my personal 
experiences and constantly compared my personal 
incidence to incidence. I induced initial codes and 
partially identiϐied categories with its properties. 
With the interest of induction, I continued the 
procedure with other cases (not incidence; 
experiences of others through interview and from 
those documented in the literature). I noticed that 
I was doing something similar to phenomenology 
and ethnography. I was not doing GT. I was not 
conceptualizing but rather describing. 
My dilemma in doing data analysis using 
QDA brought me to reading the article of Glaser 
(2004) titled Remodeling Grounded Theory. 
There, I realized that I was trapped with the QDA 
approach which leads me to: (1) description 
rather than conceptualization; and (2) qualitative 
data analysis block. 
First we need to revisit the concepts of QDA. 
QDA is focused on accuracy, truth, trustworthiness 
or objectivity of data. Stringent procedures are 
prescribed in enhancing these issues. With my 
worry to develop accurate codes from data to get 
rid of subjectivity issues, quarantined me to the 
QDA trap. Unluckily, these are not the concern of 
GT.
The trap of QDA eroded me from the goal 
of conceptualizing a theory and brought me to 
the descriptive baggage. My realization of not 
producing conceptual theory of illuminating the 
essential communal patterns that are functional 
to the domain of inquiry marked me to realign my 
methods to the GT process.  
With my realization, I started to analyze 
my theoretically sampled codes with memo 
writing. It is in the memo writing procedure 
that allowed me to (1) document my reϐlection; 
(2) describe the patterns induced from data; (3) 
identify relationships between categories; and 
(4) generate conceptualizations (Polit & Beck, 
2012). It was when I shifted to this approach that 
I started to feel that I am doing GT. It was never 
a linear approach. In fact, the emergent process 
was a continuous and a cyclical amalgamation of: 
(a) data collection; (b) coding; and (c) conceptual 
analysis (Glaser, 2004). These were constantly 
documented with my memos. 
GT Data Analysis 
Substantive vs. Theoretical Codes. 
Glaserian data analysis was used to formulate 
conceptualizations: data into patterns. The 
elements of the domain of inquiry were abstracted 
through substantive codes and theoretical codes 
(Polit & Beck, 2012). Theoretical codes provided 
awareness on the relationship of each substantive 
code. Substantive codes were processed in two 
stages (Polit & Beck, 2012; Charmaz, 2006): (1) 
open; and (2) selective or focused.
Open coding was the ϐirst stage of my constant 
comparative analysis. Openness mandated to 
detain the grounded concepts from the data. 
Incidences were scrutinized for similarities and 
differences. It allowed me to identify categories 
and its properties (Glaser, 1978). In this stage, I 
inaugurated: (1) line-by-line; (2) paragraph; and 
(3) document coding. It covered the Level I codes. 
When initial codes were developed, theoretical 
sampling took place. I then started to write memos 
to condense Level I codes. The condensed codes 
enclosed the Level II codes. When categories and 
properties were identiϐied, Level III coding was 
done. Level III codes are theoretical constructs. 
Level I codes are basic concepts while Level III 
codes are more abstract ones. As cited by Polit and 
Beck (2012), these constructs add scope beyond 
local meanings (Glaser, 1978) in generating the 
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theory. This process allowed the identiϐication 
of constructs. Open coding culminated after 
ascertaining the core category. Glaser identiϐied 
nine criteria in determining the core category. 
It must: (1) be central to many or all categories; 
(2) saturate from data frequently; (3) take some 
time to saturate compared to the other categories; 
(4) have a signiϐicant relationship with other 
categories; (5) be clear, seizing insinuations for 
formal applications; (6) have substantial carry-
through; (7) be completely variable; (8) be a 
dimension of the domain of inquiry; and (9) be a 
theoretical code. 
The next stage was selective or focused coding. 
This stage involved multiple levels of abstraction. 
I only coded those data that were relevant to the 
core category. It then led me to theoretical coding. 
This stage allowed interlacing the fragmented 
pieces of data back together. The codes allowed 
theoretical capture (Glaser, 2005). It delivered 
superior explanatory power that heightened 
meaningful abstraction of the relationships 
between categories. 
Data Analysis, Memos and Fit. During coding 
and analysis, I documented my ideas about the 
data, categories, and conceptual scheme emerging 
from the memos. The actual memos preserved the 
substantive application. GT does not necessitate 
the discovery of novel categories. It means we 
do not ignore those previously identiϐied by 
literature. The mission is to progress an emergent 
ϐit between the data and category that might work. 
Pre-existing categories were not simply borrowed 
but earned its way to the theory. 
GT is concerned with generating categories 
and hypotheses rather than testing them. The 
product is usually a theoretical model that 
endeavors to explain most of the involved 
processes in the domain of inquiry (Glaser, 2001). 
Although GTists are warned in referring to the 
available literature before a theoretical framework 
is stabilized, this process is also emergent and 
ϐlexible in nature (Glaser, 1978) depending on the 
need of the domain of inquiry.  
V. CONCLUSION 
I shall claim that this research is neither 
a dogmatic classical or constructivist GT nor 
a practitioner theory building methodology. 
It is safe to say that this is a novel research 
methodology based on existing procedures and 
modiϐied to suit the need of my inquiry - a synergy 
of three methods with personal inputs based on 
my personal philosophical stances.  
What you want to know dictates what you 
do. Although recommendations are available, 
tailored-ϐit procedures allow better discovery. 
Forcing recommendations or dogmatic procedures 
compromise the analytic process and is a misuse 
of the forced methodology. Investigators must 
realize that doing research need not follow strict 
doctrines prescribed or suggested by research 
methodologists. One must think and do things 
outside the box. Novel innovations and discoveries 
were derived from new methodologies. Scholars 
need not replicate what had been done before. 
It is noteworthy however, to recognize them as 
helpful guides on how to commence and proceed 
with their scholarship. Along the way, researchers 
can always deviate from what is normatively 
accepted. For me, that is true scholarship. We 
should not think the same way, otherwise, we end 
up searching and researching similar things. 
I am sure that other scholars will scrutinize 
and critique this methodology.  That is why they 
are there. It is their role. It is in disagreements 
where scholars came into being. The arena where 
exchanges of ideas and stances that transported 
debate and divide allowed the progression of 
disciplines rapidly. It takes revolutionary steps to 
challenge the status quo. It needs another Albert 
Einstein to create unacceptable discoveries for 
utility after decades from its discovery. 
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